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Abstract 
 
The aging of existing local authority housing stock in the UK combined with years of 
under-investment has brought the repair and maintenance (R&M) of social housing 
under the political spotlight. In their 2001 manifesto Labour committed to reducing 
the ‘£20bn repairs backlog for 4m homes in Britain’ by a third by 2004 and 
eradicating it by 2010. However, rather than investing in a repairs programme, in 
2003 the government offered extra funds to local authorities to relinquish their 
responsibility for the management and repair of their housing stock to arm’s-length 
management organisations (ALMOs). In other words they encouraged local 
authorities to outsource their R&M services to the private sector. In contrast to this, 
evidence from both the public and private sectors favours the retention of R&M 
services in house. This dichotomy gives rise to a number of questions relating to: the 
viability of outsourcing housing R&M services in local authorities; the implications of 
outsourcing for organisation of R&M service delivery and management of the service 
contract, and its impact on the quality of the service provided and on the construction 
industry in general. These questions point the direction for future research, which is 
the subject of discussion of this paper. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Housing repair and maintenance (R&M) constitutes nearly 59% of local authorities’ 
total construction work by value, which in turn makes up over 28% of all construction 
work (DTI, 2004). The aging of the existing local authority housing stock combined 
with years of under-investment has brought the R&M of social housing under the 
political spotlight and made it the subject of Labour’s manifesto pledge in 2001. 
When the labour administration came to power in 1997 it inherited a ‘£20bn repairs 
backlog for 4m homes in Britain’ (Hetherington, 2003). In its 2001 manifesto Labour 
committed itself to reducing the backlog of sub-standard housing by a third by 2004 
(Foot, 2004) and eradicating it by 2010 (Weaver, 2004b) to achieve their decent home 
standard (http://www.odpm.gov.uk). However, rather than investing in a repairs 
programme to meet these targets, in 2003 the government offered extra funds to local 
authorities to relinquish their responsibility for the management and repair of their 
housing stock to arm’s-length management organisations (ALMOs) (Hetherington, 
2003). In other words the government encouraged local authorities to outsource their 
R&M function to the private sector. This surpasses the requirements of Best Value 
contained in the Local Government Act 1999 in terms of ensuring that services are 
competitive with the best available by assuming that a private organisation would 
better manage the day-to-day activities of a local authority’s housing department.   
 
Contrary to the Government’s view, the Association of Public Services Excellence 
(APSE), formerly the Association of Direct Labour Organisations (ADLO), claims 
that public services can and do ‘perform at the highest level’ by embracing change 
and responding to challenges (APSE, 2003). They demonstrate through case studies 
that local authority construction departments are implementing new ways of working 
in response to challenges of Best Value and are investing in training and staff 
development as part of their emphasis on quality service provision (APSE, 2002). The 
Housing Forum’s report on good practices in the housebuilding sector endorses 
APSE’s assertions. Two of the case studies included in this report are the building 
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works department and the Direct Service Organisation within two councils; they 
provide R&M services to the councils’ housing stocks. The highlights of their good 
practices are: recruitment strategies incorporating beneficial employment terms and 
conditions, well-established systems of apprenticeships focusing on selection, 
reviews, support and guidance, retention strategies of employee development and 
internal promotion linked to performance management, and equal opportunities aimed 
at integrating women and ethnic minorities into the trades (CE - Housing Forum, 
2004). 
 
There are also examples of organisations, which have hitherto outsourced service 
operations to the private sector, reversing this trend. Network Rail, for instance, 
brought back the outsourced maintenance contracts in-house in October 2003. The 
director of Network Rail maintenance ascribed this decision to not getting ‘value for 
money’ from outsourcing. He identified some of the difficulties of outsourcing as 
‘wildly inconsistent [supplier] prices’ of maintenance contractors, having to monitor 
each company’s work, and having to contend with lack of information about staff 
details, the age of the network, and the maintenance regime (Reisner, 2004). The 
director went on to claim that maintenance conditions have improved under the new 
regime. 
 
The questions that arise at this juncture are: 1) what makes outsourcing R&M in local 
authority housing an attractive option to the policy makers; 2) what are the 
performance benefits and disadvantages to local authorities of outsourcing the R&M 
service delivery to ALMOs compared to its retention in-house; 3) how does 
outsourcing R&M impact on the quality of the service provided to the recipients; and 
4) how does outsourcing housing R&M affect the construction industry in general? To 
seek answers to the above questions the paper reviews policy issues and evidence 
related to best value; the arguments for and against ALMOs; the evidence of 
performance on R&M service delivery by an ALMO and a local authority; and the 
relationship between the R&M sector and the construction industry at large.  
 
The paper has three aims. Firstly, it questions the viability of ALMOs as a panacea to 
the performance problems of local authorities in the area of R&M by considering two 
case studies extracted from the audit commission’s inspection reports. Secondly, it 
extrapolates the impact of outsourcing local authority housing R&M on the 
construction industry in general. Thirdly, it identifies gaps in knowledge and points 
out the directions for future research. The structure of the paper is as follows: the 
policy and theoretical context, contains the review of relevant policy documents and 
literature. The cases for and against ALMOs provides information on the available 
existing trends in R&M service delivery, both externally and internally, in a local 
authority. The impact of ALMOs on the construction industry extrapolates the 
problems identified through the case studies to local construction markets and the 
construction industry in general. The section on directions for future research suggests 
areas where future research is required to unravel the kind of information that cannot 
currently be obtained from the audit commission’s inspection reports. 
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The policy and theoretical context 
 
The government introduced the best value initiative through the Local Government 
Act 1999 with the aim of improving the quality of local government services. Best 
value requires local authorities to achieve ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ by 
continuously improving the way in which they carry out their functions. Performance 
is measured through indicators and achievement of standards set by the Secretary of 
State, which may vary for different functions and different authorities and may apply 
at different times. Performance is checked through annual inspections by the audit 
commission and more specifically by the housing inspectorate within the commission 
in relation to councils’ housing services. (http://www.hmso.gov.uk). 
 
In March 2000 the audit commission’s survey indicated that only 88% of council 
housing repairs were carried out within government time limits (Wintour, 2001). In 
March 2001 of the 20 local authority housing inspections that were carried out no 
council was awarded ‘excellent or three-star best value rating’, which was the score 
that the councils required in order to borrow from the then £160 million government 
fund to refurbish their housing stock (Weaver, 2001). In 2004 the government 
required councils to make efficiency savings of £280 million a year in management 
and maintenance by 2007/08 (Evans, 2004). In addition to time, funding and cost 
pressures on the councils, as part of best value regime they also have to show that 
their in-house service is competitive compared to that provided by firms in the private 
sector otherwise they have to cede control of the service to a private firm or the 
voluntary sector (Weaver and Parker, 2002).  
 
The bulk of the evidence reported in the press indicates that best value is being 
interpreted mainly in terms of economy and efficiency rather than effectiveness and 
quality of services delivered. For example, two performance indicators on the cost per 
local authority dwelling of housing management and repairs were dropped due to the 
‘difficulty of measuring’ them, which according to the chief executive of HouseMark 
were necessary for monitoring the progress on cost effectiveness. Furthermore the 
performance indicator on ‘repairs completed within government time limits’ was 
replaced with one on ‘the number of appointments kept’, which again according to 
HouseMark’s chief executive ‘fails to capture the speed and quality of actual repairs’ 
(Martin, 2001). The changes made to the indicators have the added disadvantage of 
making it ‘impossible to say whether best value had been a success’ according to the 
director of Housing Quality Network (Inside Housing, 2002). 
 
The privatisation agenda is being pushed by the government and taken up by local 
authorities fervently. In 2004 the government were only prepared to make extra 
resources available for council home improvements if local authorities switched their 
management to ALMOs, private finance initiative or housing associations (Weaver, 
2004a). The audit commission’s report in 2001 criticised councils for ‘shying away 
from competition and “making a priority of keeping services in-house”’ (Brown, 
2001). The audit commission inspectors recommended that Harlow Council outsource 
part of its repairs service in its inspection in 2000. Councils who fail to pass the audit 
commission inspections tend to privatise the failed service function rather than 
attempt to work on improving it. For instance Castle Morpeth Council, which was 
awarded a zero star rating for its maintenance in 2001, closed down the department 
and invited private contractors to tender for the work. The role of privatisation as ‘the 
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elixir for poor performance’ is questioned, however, by the director of Housing 
Quality Network who is reported to suggest learning from leading councils as a better 
way forward for failing councils (Humphries, 2001). 
 
Based on the above discussion what appears to make outsourcing the R&M function 
in local authority housing an attractive option to policy makers is the shifting of 
responsibility and resources away from the public sector and the government to the 
private sector and the market. The drive for the privatisation of local authority 
housing including R&M services has taken three forms, stock transfers, Public 
Finance Initiative (PFIs) and ALMOs. A large volume of literature has been written 
about stock transfers and PFIs and their perceived benefits in terms of performance 
improvement questioned. The criticisms tend to range from lack of empirical evidence 
supporting the improvements ascribed to separation of housing management 
(www.defendcouncilhousing.co.uk) to empirical evidence demonstrating the failure of 
some PFIs to achieve their cost or time targets as well as falling short in the levels and 
quality of services they deliver (for example, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000a; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). There have also been claims about the adverse 
impact of PFIs on the terms and conditions of employment of the workers who are 
transferred from the public organisation to the private partner as well as on ‘the 
erosion of the public sector ethos amongst workers’ (for instance, Grimshaw et al., 
2002; Hebson et al., 2003). These issues are relevant to ALMOs and will therefore be 
considered in the examination of ALMOs’ performance benefits and disadvantages to 
local authorities.  
 
 
The cases for and against ALMOs 
 
ALMOs are ‘companies limited by guarantee and as such as not profit making. They 
are independent from the Council but provide housing services to tenants and 
leaseholders under a management agreement’ (NHF, 2003). This is the definition 
provided by the National Housing Federation’s briefing note number 6. In layman’s 
terms ALMOs are private organisations set up by local authorities to carry out the 
day-to-day management of their housing stock whilst leaving the ownership of the 
stock with the councils. Their board of directors comprise one-third tenants, one-third 
local stakeholders such as voluntary groups and one-third councillors (Hetherington, 
2003). The government argues the case for the separation of housing management 
from landlords on the basis of the performance improvement potential of privatisation 
primarily in terms of cost savings and efficiency gains as well as the empowerment of 
tenants in terms of their involvement in the management of their homes and ensuring 
that services are responsive to their needs (ODPM, 2004).  
 
The case against the separation of the management function is based on arguments 
relating to the attributes of a private company, the uneasy marriage of private and 
public realms and the consequences for the public sector workforce, on the one hand 
and the tenants, on the other. Firstly, it is argued that setting up private companies is 
not cheap. For example, Defend Council Housing reports that Leeds spent £1 million 
on ALMO managers whilst Ashfield’s ALMO cost £2 million to set up. The cost 
includes ‘new corporate images and logos’ as well as advertising; Camden Council 
spent £500,000 on the promotion of ALMOs to tenants who rejected the option 
outright (www.defendcouncilhousing.co.uk). Secondly, according to company law 
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board members are legally required to prioritise the interests of the company and in 
practice the company’s senior management make the decisions. Therefore tenants’ 
representation on the board of directors may not have real empowering effect. 
Thirdly, the separation of the strategic housing function provided by the local 
authority, as required by the ODPM guidelines (NHF, 2003), from the operational 
function provided by the ALMO may create co-operation problems particularly due to 
the divergent cultures of the organisations and the philosophies that underpin their 
raison d’etre (Grimshaw et al., 2002; Hebson et al., 2003). Fourthly, the decision to 
outsource the management of housing inevitably entails closure of departments within 
councils, transfer of staff or redundancies, which have consequences not only for the 
human resources concerned but also for the recruitment and retention of human 
resources within the sector. This is reflected in the NHF’s Good practice briefing note 
number 6 published by the ODPM, which deals with the staffing issues in ALMOs 
(NHF, 2003). The last two cases against ALMOs are considered in more depth below 
where the R&M service provision by an ALMO and a local authority is examined and 
the impact of each on service quality assessed. 
 
The R&M service provision by an ALMO and their impact on service quality 
The Guidance on arms length management of local authority housing (2004) sets out 
the roles and responsibilities of local authorities and ALMOs. According to the guide, 
in the context of the R&M service provision by ALMOs, the local authority’s role is 
to carry out cross-tenure stock condition surveys, determine minimum standards of 
service required of the ALMO and monitor its performance. Therefore it is the local 
authority that sets the standards of service to be delivered by the ALMO. The local 
authority has statutory responsibility for delivering the housing management service 
and can terminate its management agreement with the ALMO if its performance is 
inadequate. The ALMO’s role is to make and implement decisions about stock 
investment and to promote tenant participation and their involvement in monitoring 
and reviewing service standards. It is responsible for planning and procurement of 
repair and improvement works, for delivering best value, and for following best 
practice in procurement through partnering arrangements with contractors or 
participating in procurement consortia with other ALMOs and registered social 
landlords. The ALMO board is responsible for the performance and operation of the 
ALMO and is accountable to the local authority under the terms of its management 
agreement (ODPM, 2004).  
 
The establishment of ALMOs is administratively complex and resource consuming 
thus explaining the high set up costs referred to above in relation to specific councils. 
The NHF’s Good practice briefing note number 6, which deals with staffing 
implications of ALMOs is indicative of this complexity (NHF, 2003). The briefing 
note provides guidance on three areas: 1) why should an authority consider an 
ALMO; 2) what does the transition to an ALMO involve; and 3) what are the issues to 
consider post transition to an ALMO?  
 
The first area covers: 1) the potential impact of the transition to an ALMO on the 
local authority services and staff concerned; 2) the need for inclusion of all 
stakeholders in the process of consultation about the transition; 3) the financial and 
staffing implication of the jobs that will stay within the council and those that will be 
transferred to the ALMO; 4) the financial implications of ‘desegragation of budgets, 
actuarial costs for pensions, ownership of assets and liabilities and indemnities and 
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insurance’ as well as the cost of staff that would be transferred, deliberation of which 
would require specialist advice; 5) allocation of adequate timing to the consideration 
of issues related to human resources; and 6) the resources required for the 
management and co-ordination of the change process, which would also require 
specialist support on legal, human resources, finance and estate issues.  
 
The second area includes: 1) determining which staff will potentially transfer to the 
ALMO; 2) informing and consulting employees and their representatives; 3) basing 
the transfers on the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) 
Regulations; 4) protecting the continuous service of transferred local government 
employees; 5) ALMO’s potential employees’ membership of Local Government 
Pension Scheme; 6) allocating adequate time to verification of information to be 
provided to the ALMO; 7) using redeployment procedures for staff identified as “at 
risk”; 8) providing formal notification to staff who will transfer to the ALMO; and 9) 
providing opportunities for involvement and support of employees. 
 
The third area comprises: 1) protecting the terms and conditions of employment of 
ALMO employees, both transferred and new staff; 2) monitoring the changing terms 
and conditions of ALMO employees; 3) determining the trade unions that will be 
recognised in the ALMO; and 4) continuing the employment of ALMO employees 
who return to local government employment.  
 
A cursory look at the above issues indicates not only the myriad of organisational 
tasks and processes that are involved in the setting up of an ALMO but also the 
numerous transaction costs that they potentially give rise to in the form of monitoring 
performance, seeking specialist advice and obtaining specialist support. There are also 
additional transaction costs associated with subcontracting and outsourcing that 
characterise the procurement of construction including repair and maintenance work. 
These observations beg two questions: how are the cost savings and efficiency gains 
required by best value regime going to be delivered by ALMOs, and what impact are 
ALMOs going to have on the quality of services delivered to tenants? To explore 
these questions an example of an ALMO that scored 2 stars in the audit commission’s 
inspection is presented below based on extracts from the audit commission’s 
inspection report. 
 
Case study 1: Kirklees landlord (ALMO) services 
Summary 
Kirklees is a metropolitan district in West Yorkshire, covering 254 square miles, over two thirds of which is 
protected rural landscape. It has a population of 390,000 with a significant ethnic minority population of 10.7%.  
 
The Council 
The Council comprises 72 councillors. Its business is governed by an executive Cabinet of eight members with a 
scrutiny committee and ten scrutiny panels, including a Housing scrutiny panel. The Council operates eight 
housing management committees based in different areas of the district allowing local people and residents and 
tenants group representatives to discuss local housing issues with members, officers and other agencies. The 
Council has also set up eight Area Committees to engage with local communities. 
 
Council housing in Kirklees 
The Council has a housing stock of 27,773 dwellings. Following a stock option appraisal in early 2001 to assess 
the most effective way of ensuring the necessary levels of investment to improve and maintain their housing stock 
in future years, the Council decided to set up an ALMO. They bid for ALMO funding to the DTLR for 2002/2003 
and succeeded in their bid. The ALMO was established at the beginning of April 2002 to undertake the landlord 
functions of the Council’s Housing Service. The initial agreement between the Council and the ALMO is for five 
years. The functions delegated to the ALMO include stock condition surveys of local authority housing; 
administration and implementation of the responsive repairs contract; and management of planned and 
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programmed maintenance, modernisation and improvements. The expenditure on responsive repairs for 2002/2003 
was £5.8 million.  
 
The ALMO 
A board of fifteen Directors made up of five tenant representatives, five council nominees and five independent 
representatives manages the ALMO. A senior management team of staff transferred from the Council runs the 
company on a day-to-day basis. There is a Chief Executive. The management team and other staff are located in 
separate premises. If the standard of the Housing Service meets Government criteria the Council will access a 
capital allocation of £62.5 million over two years. The ALMO is responsible for delivering the programme of 
improvements and manages the Council’s budget for day-to-day repairs. 
 
Score of the service 
The housing inspector assessed the Council as providing a ‘good’, two star service that has promising prospects for 
improvement because: 
• Access to services is good, and the information available for tenants is comprehensive and available in a 
variety of formats.  
• The service is customer-focused, and tenants are centrally involved in service design and delivery.  
• The repairs service achieves some good outcomes for tenants, and performs well against relevant 
performance indicators. 
• It has improved the appearance and cleanliness of estates through its area caretaker scheme.  
• The concierge scheme has helped improve security and customer contact in high-rise blocks of 
properties.  
• Tenant participation is good, although more needs to be and is being done to involve those who do not 
wish to participate in formal structures. 
 
The inspection revealed a number of weaknesses, which require improvement: 
• Customers are currently confused about aspects of the service which Council department or function is 
responsible for delivering; the ALMO and the Council are working to improve this situation.  
• The decorations allowance scheme is not making the best use of available resources, although it does 
reflect the views and preferences of tenants.  
• The appearance of estates is mixed, and the use of metal sheeting on void properties detracts from the 
overall attractiveness of them.  
• There are a series of value for money issues in relation to the responsive repairs service, which must be 
addressed if funding available for this service is to be maximised, in particular:  
o the high proportion of emergency and urgent repairs;  
o the high level of responses to planned repairs; and  
o the use of the national Schedule of Rates for relatively large scale works. 
 
In relation to the prospects for improvement, the inspectors believed: 
• The Council has conducted thorough and searching best value reviews and in general has challenged the 
way in which services are delivered.  
• The Council has a culture of performance management and continuous improvement and has achieved a 
good deal within a relatively short time-scale.  
• There is a strong sense of partnership between the ALMO, the Council and tenants;  
• There is a clear track record of achievement.  
• The Council and the ALMO are ‘learning’ organisations, and are seeking to learn from the experience of 
top performers in a number of areas.  
• A more co-ordinated approach is being taken to the management of service improvement plans. 
• Improvements in performance management have emanated from the inspection process.  
• A more focussed approach is being taken to future stock investment.  
• The ALMO cannot currently be described as fully ‘arms-length’, although proposals are being developed 
to achieve this within the next six months.  
• Efforts are being made to improve representation of independent experts and broader sectors of the 
community on ALMOs’ boards.  
• There has been mixed success in delivering improvements proposed from early best value reviews and 
delivery on all fronts at once has proved to be extremely challenging. 
 
Recommendations 
The housing inspectors recommended that the ALMO and the Council take action to resolve a number of general, 
political, managerial and partnership issues. 
 
The ALMO and the Council should implement the following recommendations: 
• Continue to improve joint working between their departments to resolve disputes regarding who is 
responsible for various estate-based tasks in order to reduce confusion and frustration for customers.  
• Continue to develop measures for increasing tenant involvement outside of formal structures, and 
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increase the level of involvement of traditionally excluded groups.  
• Review and improve the decorations allowance scheme  in order to make available resources go further.  
• Improve the appearance of sheeted up void properties on estates, and monitor the extent of damage done 
by contractors in erecting the sheeting.  
• Continue to ensure that proposals for future area office provision are developed in conjunction with the 
Council’s Customer Contact Point Strategy, and that tenants remain fully involved in this process.  
• Address all the value for money issues related to responsive repairs service within an agreed timescale.  
• Complete the review of support services and ensure that the ALMO obtains best value for money and 
cost-effective services from internal and external providers. 
• Ensure that personal development reviews are carried out regularly and that relevant documentation is 
completed and monitored.  
• Evaluate the potential gains to be made from looking at the procurement of responsive repairs and 
planned maintenance contracts together.  
• Following twelve months of the operation of the ALMO, review decision-making structures to ensure 
that these are stream-lined and effective and maintain successful tenant consultation and participation.   
• Ensure a genuine separation of the roles of the ALMO and the Council to make sure the ALMO’s ‘arms-
length’ status is clear and well-defined, with unambiguous lines of responsibility for the delivery of 
service management and improvement.  
• Share a copy of this report with tenants, councillors and other stakeholders. 
Source: www.audit-commission.gov.uk 
 
The housing inspector’s judgements on their own do not provide the means to assess 
the performance advantages and disadvantages of the ALMO. To undertake such as 
assessment a source of comparison is needed in the form of the council’s in-house 
provision of R&M services prior to setting up the ALMO. This is provided below. 
  
The R&M service provision by a local authority and their impact on service quality 
To meet the government’s decent home standard targets the councils have to assess 
the nature of disrepair in their stock, compare them to the decent home standard, cost 
the required works, consider the options for raising the necessary investment and 
ensure that they are achieving best value for money by continuously improving their 
service provision (www.odpm.gov.uk). An example is provided below of Kirklees 
council, that scored ‘good’/two star rating in 2001 subsequent to the audit 
commission’s inspection.  
 
Case study 2: Kirklees Metropolitan Council 
Council housing and housing services department in Kirklees in 2000/2001 
The Council had an annual budget of 5.75 million for repairs in 2000/2001. The Housing Services Department 
manages the 28,698 council dwellings from a decentralised network of 17 Area Housing Offices across the 
borough, each headed by an Area Team Manager responsible for a range of functions including repairs. To provide 
better co-ordination of services from housing offices the Council has appointed six Neighbourhood Service 
Managers each responsible for two or three Area Housing Offices. 
 
Repair service organisation 
The senior management of the housing department provide functional support to the department’s operations. 
There are six Service Managers reporting to the Chief Housing Officer. Repairs are covered by the Service 
Managers for Housing Management and Programmes, Projects and Technical.  
There is a well-developed tenant participation structure within Kirklees. The Kirklees Federation of Tenants and 
Residents Associations (KFTRA) was founded in 1987. There are currently over 100 local tenants and residents 
groups operating in the borough. Their representatives meet with officers and members through local area Housing 
Management Committees each cycle, which feed into the Housing Services Management Board within the 
Council’s cabinet structure. There are a number of other established means of consultation, involvement and 
participation for tenants and residents groups, for example, estate inspections, annual investment conference, and 
repairs working group. A number of initiatives have been introduced in partnership with KFTRA, for example, 
appointments for day- to- day repairs and ‘quality guarantees’ for services provided. 
 
The Council have estimated a major shortfall in the investment required on their housing stock of: 
• £130 million backlog of stock repairs;  
• £125 million backlog of stock improvements; and  
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• £17.5 million shortfall in investment each year based on the current available resources. 
 
The Council are considering longer-term options for their housing stock including stock transfer, PFI and Arms 
Length Organisations. 
 
Score of the service 
The Council was awarded Beacon Status in 1999 for improving its housing maintenance service. In 2001 The 
housing inspector assessed the service as a Good service because: 
• The Council has developed a strategic approach to repairs and maintenance and are pursuing a policy to 
increase planned maintenance to 70% of the repairs and maintenance budget, which allows more 
effective use of resources. 
• The volume of day-to-day repairs processed reduced from 92,500 orders in 1996/1997 to 84,000 in 
1999/2000 and the anticipated outturn for 2000/2001 is 77,000 orders. 
• The repairs budget is managed well and ensures an efficient use of resources.  
• The costs of commissioning the repair and maintenance service are low. 
• Over half of day-to-day repairs are completed by appointment 
• Tenants have high levels of satisfaction with the service.  
• Tenants are involved in the planning and monitoring of the repairs service and a number of 
developments in the service have followed from their requests.  
• There are high levels of customer care in the repairs and maintenance service, for example, operatives 
with uniforms and identity cards, freephone contact to Building Services and a proactive customer 
comments scheme.   
• The Council uses monitoring and performance data to improve services to tenants.  
• Improved working relationship between Housing and Building Services has led to a more co-ordinated 
service to tenants.  
 
There were however shortcomings: 
• Lack of training of front line staff has led to some inconsistency in approach to dealing with tenants’ 
repair reporting and prioritisation of works orders and hence the time tenants have to wait for repairs to 
be completed.  
• Inconsistent application of repairs policies across the district has led to differences in service to tenants.  
• The repairs guide does not make reference to the urgent repairs category.  
• The appointments system, the co-ordination of building and housing services as well as information to 
tenants requires improvement on its current 53% success rate.  
• Not all complaints on repairs are dealt with within the timescales set by the Council.  
• The high proportion of emergency repairs leads to an ineffective use of limited resources.  
• The bonus scheme is not consistent with quality and continuous improvement in repair work. 
 
The housing inspector was satisfied that the service will improve because: 
• The Best Value Regime action plan has taken on board all the issues that tenants felt were key for 
improvement.  
• The Council has good monitoring systems and acts upon the information produced to improve services.  
• The tenants’ movement in Kirklees will ensure improvement in the service.  
• There is a genuine commitment from the officers across the departments to improve particularly with the 
continuous process improvement working groups who are looking at service improvements across a 
range of services.  
• Improvements including the implementation of a dedicated call centre, joint working between Housing 
and Building Services, streamlining the client and contractor roles and the adoption of a ‘right first time’ 
approach to the repairs service will bring improvements to tenants using the repairs service. 
• The Council has demonstrated by already implementing initiatives from its improvement plan that it has 
the ability to ensure improvements do happen on the ground. 
 
The housing inspector recommended that the Council should: 
• Ensure proper induction and training for frontline repairs staff to enable consistency of approach and 
correct repairs identification and categorisation.  
• Identify reasons for delays in responding to complaints and implement performance management 
measures to ensure compliance with corporate targets;  
• Ensure that repairs guides for tenants fully reflected all repairs categories.  
• Make the appointments system and repairs standards more widely publicised to raise customer 
awareness.  
• Investigate with tenants how the proportion of emergency repairs can be reduced.  
• Introduce a code of conduct for sub-contractors to ensure that similar levels of customer care to those in 
place for Building Services are adopted.  
• Identify measurable and challenging targets that will demonstrate benefits to customers with reference to 
the top performing 25% of authorities. 
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In order to assess the performance benefits and disadvantages to Kirklees council of 
outsourcing the R&M service delivery compared to its retention in-house, the scores 
that the housing inspector granted to the council in 2003 and 2001 are tabulated in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Performance of Kirklees ALMO versus Kirklees Council 
Score of the services Kirklees ALMO Kirklees Council 
 Strategic approach to R&M; policy to 
increase planned maintenance to 70% of 
the R&M budget; more effective use of 
resources. 
Reduction in volume of day-to-day repairs 
from 92,500 orders in 1996/1997 to 84,000 
in 1999/2000 and anticipated 77,000 in 
2000/2001. 
Well-managed repairs budget and efficient 
use of resources.  
Low costs of R&M service commissioning. 
Over half of day-to-day repairs being 
completed by appointment. 
The repairs service achieving some good 
outcomes for tenants, and performing well 
against relevant performance indicators. 
 
The area caretaker scheme having 
improved appearance and cleanliness of 
estates.  
 
The concierge scheme having improved 
security and customer contact in high-rise 
blocks of properties. 
High levels of tenant satisfaction with the 
service. 
Tenants centrally involved in service 
design and delivery; good tenant 
participation, more involvement needed of 
those who do not participate in formal 
structures. 
Tenant involvement in planning, 
monitoring, and development of repairs 
service. 
Customer-focused service; good access to 
services; comprehensive information 
available in a variety of formats to tenants.  
 
 
High levels of customer care in the R&M 
service, e.g., operatives with uniforms and 
identity cards, freephone contact to 
Building Services, proactive customer 
comments scheme. 
 Council’s use of monitoring and 
performance data to improve services. 
Strengths 
 Improved working relationship between 
Housing and Building Services and co-
ordinated service to tenants. 
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Mixed appearance of estates; use of metal 
sheeting on void properties detracting from 
states’ attractiveness. 
Inconsistent application of repairs policies 
across the district leading to differences in 
service to tenants.  
Customers’ confusion about the Council’s 
and ALMO’s responsibility for aspects of 
service delivery. 
 
 The repairs guide not making reference to 
the urgent repairs category. 
 Lack of training of front line staff leading 
to inconsistency in dealing with tenants’ 
repair reporting, prioritisation of orders, 
and tenants’ waiting time for completion of 
repairs. 
 
The appointments system, co-ordination of 
building/housing services and information 
to tenants have 53% success rate.  
 
Not all complaints on repairs being dealt 
with within timescales set by the Council.  
Value for money issues regarding 
responsive repairs service to be addressed 
to maximise available funding, particularly: 
high proportion of emergency and urgent 
repairs;  
high level of responses to planned repairs;  
use of national Schedule of Rates for 
relatively large scale works. 
 
The decorations allowance scheme not 
making best use of available resources 
though reflecting tenants’ views and 
preferences. 
The high proportion of emergency repairs 
leads to ineffective use of limited 
resources.  
 
Weaknesses 
 The bonus scheme not consistent with 
quality and continuous improvement in 
repair work. 
The Council’s thorough and searching best 
value reviews challenging the way in which 
services are delivered. 
 
The Council having achieved a good deal 
within a relatively short time-scale due to 
its culture of performance management and 
continuous improvement. 
Mixed success in delivering improvements 
proposed from early best value reviews; 
delivery on all fronts at once proving 
extremely challenging. 
A strong sense of partnership between the 
ALMO, the Council and tenants. 
Best Value Regime action plan taking on 
board all issues that tenants considered key 
for improvement. 
A clear track record of achievement. The Council’s implementation of initiatives 
from its improvement plan ensuring 
improvements happened on the ground. 
The Council and the ALMO being 
‘learning’ organisations, seeking to learn 
from top performers in a number of areas. 
The Council acting upon information 
produced by good monitoring systems to 
improve services. 
 
The tenants’ movement in Kirklees 
ensuring improvement in the service. 
A more co-ordinated approach being taken 
to management of service improvement 
plans. 
 
Commitment from officers across 
departments to improve with continuous 
process improvement; working groups 
looking at service improvements across a 
range of services.  
Prospects for 
improvements  
Improvements in performance management 
emanating from the inspection process. 
Improvements including implementation of 
a dedicated call centre, joint working 
between Housing and Building Services, 
and adoption of a ‘right first time’ 
approach to repairs service likely to bring 
improvements to tenants using the service. 
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A more focussed approach being taken to 
future stock investment. 
 
The ALMO currently not fully ‘arms-
length’, proposals being developed to 
achieve this within the next six months. 
 
Efforts being made to improve 
representation of independent experts and 
broader sectors of community on ALMOs’ 
boards. 
 
 
 
The comparison of the scores of the R&M services in Kirklees ALMO and Kirkless 
council indicates few performance benefits and little service quality enhancements to 
the council of outsourcing the management of the R&M service compared to its 
retention in-house. For example, in 2001 the council had adopted the strategy of 
increasing planned maintenance to 70% of the R&M budget, which is a more 
effective use of available resources, whereas no such strategy was reported in 2003 in 
relation to Kirklees ALMO. There is also no reference made to the ALMO’s use of 
monitoring and performance data to improve services, which appears as an element of 
strength in the score of the council. Furthermore, the council’s operations appear to 
have been more integrated with the tenants’ inputs and involvement than is the case 
with the ALMO. In terms of weaknesses, a number of issues stand out against the 
ALMO such as, the tenants’ confusion about the ALMO’s and the council’s 
responsibilities for aspects of service delivery, value for money issues and not making 
best use of available resources. In terms of prospects for improvement, the ALMO 
scores favourably with reference to their more focused approach to future stock 
investment, although the nature of this approach is not made clear. The point is made, 
however, about improvement being required to representation of independent experts 
and broader sectors of the community on the ALMO’s board and participation of 
tenants. This is an important issue as it relates to the empowerment of tenants and the 
community through participation on ALMOs’ boards and operations, which has been 
argued by the government as a selling attribute of ALMOs. 
 
It is fair to bear in mind that the housing inspector has judged Kirklee ALMO’s 
performance after only a year of operation. However, it is also worth considering that 
ALMOs are set up from a position of strength, i.e., they can only be set up if the 
councils can demonstrate that they meet the required performance criteria. Therefore 
it is not unreasonable to expect an ALMO to be doing at least better than the council 
that sets it up otherwise what justification is there for the ALMO’s existence? In the 
case of Kirklees council the rationale for setting up the ALMO was a major shortfall 
in the investment they required on their housing stock.  
 
 
The impact of ALMOs on the construction industry  
 
The Audit Commission’s inspection reports provide some information on local 
authorities’ R&M service budget, the kinds of R&M services that are outsourced, the 
type of outsourcing contract, and a value judgement on how good the services are 
based on the Audit Commission’s criteria. However, they do not present detailed 
information on the administrative process, the supply process, the nature of the 
service contract or the service providers (e.g., the trades), the implication of the 
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contract for management of the service, and objective measures of the service 
delivered (www.audit-commission.gov.uk).  
 
The comparison of the performances of Kirklees’ ALMO and Kirklees highlight two 
broad problems. One relates to the poor co-ordination of different functions, 
departments and responsibilities that arise from outsourcing and fragmentation of the 
supply process. The other is associated with poor value for money, manifest as  high 
proportion of emergency and urgent repairs, which may be attributed to the poor 
workmanship or the low levels of competency of the operatives carrying out the 
works. These problems are representative of deep rooted and related issues in the 
construction industry, namely, the market-based and fragmented process of 
contracting and the principally job-based and fragmented nature of training. The 
combination of these two factors creates the need for greater integration of providers’ 
inputs and a closer scrutiny of their work in terms of monitoring and management.  
 
The debate about the adverse consequences of fragmentation of the supply process on 
levels of training has been raging for some time (for example, Clarke and Wall, 
1998a). R&M is a sector that is particularly dominated by small firms. This 
dominance, it is argued, is ‘not only in sharp contradiction to the increased 
requirement for sufficiently flexible and knowledge-based skills in the industry, but at 
the same time diminishes the capability to develop these skills, reducing productivity 
and increasing production costs’ (Arkani et al., 2003b). Learning in smaller firms 
tends to be job-specific with the adverse effect on tradespersons of not being able to 
“identify and correct faults in the work of other tradespersons; and finding it difficult 
to adapt if conditions or specifications differ across projects” (Toner, 2000)’. 
Currently there is a shortage of trade skills in the UK construction industry (Clarke 
and Wall, 1998a; CITB, 2002). Skill shortages increase the cost of employing skilled 
workers (Haskel & Martin, 1996). ‘Projects cannot be resourced with an adequate 
supply of skilled labour, [the costs of works] rise, supervision increases, accidents 
may occur and delays ensue, reducing productivity and further increasing costs’ 
(Arkani et al., 2003b). There are also the additional costs emanating from the 
commissioning process of finding the best value contractor, tradesperson, or labour-
only subcontractor, the monitoring costs of establishing, measuring and reporting 
service outcome targets, and developing appropriate recourse where the targets are not 
met (Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003).  
 
Local authorities have traditionally engaged in training apprentices and by virtue of 
their size have the capacity to do so (Clarke & Wall, 1998a). How is outsourcing the 
management of the R&M services to ALMOs likely to affect training levels within 
the authorities and by implication within the local construction industries? How will it 
impact on the employment and working conditions of the building services 
departments’ workforce? 
 
 
Directions for future research 
 
There is very little academic debate relating directly to the provision of R&M in the 
public sector housing. What there is tends to be reviews of approaches to planning 
and organising repair work, provision of technical advice and access to reliable 
builders (Leather and Moseley, 2002); information on measures to deal with poor 
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housing conditions (Revell and Leather, 2000); and local authority initiatives ranging 
from providing advice about home improvements through to assistance in raising 
private finance (Groves et al., 1999).  
 
What the foregoing account indicates is the requirement for further research into the 
provision of R&M in local authority housing stock. In particular, comparative studies 
are required of local authorities’ performance prior to and after the transfer of the 
management of R&M services to ALMOs in order to gauge the differences between 
in-house and external service delivery and their impact on the quality of the service to 
tenants. Such an investigation needs to focus on the administrative and supply chains 
involved in each mode of management of the service contract, as well as their 
consequences for the human resources who are implicated in undertaking each 
contract. Future research may pursue the following objectives: 
 
1. Provide information on the local authorities that outsource R&M services 
wholly or in part and on the types of R&M services that are outsourced 
(cyclical, responsive, specific trades, particular activities, etc.).  
 
2. Provide models of R&M service provision in terms of the administrative and 
supply chains, contractual relationships, management structures, and quality 
assurance to demonstrate the relative complexities of each model.  
 
3. Analyse the particular R&M service provision models to establish the nature 
of the relationships between management input (types of managers involved 
and supervision time), service providers’ input (types of subcontractors/ 
suppliers involved and skill levels), and quality of output (response time to 
reported problems, rework, complaints, etc.).  
 
4. Explore the underlying reasons for the nature of the service contracts 
employed within each model and link them to local authority practices on 
recruitment such as the use of preferred list of subcontractors and suppliers; 
working conditions, including health and safety and training and development; 
and continuous improvement. 
 
The accomplishment of the above objectives will involve tackling a number of 
research questions including: 
 
To what extent do various components of repair and maintenance lend themselves to 
outsourcing? What are the difficulties of outsourcing particular components such as 
responsive R&M or particular trades, for example, in view of the wider skill shortages 
within the industry? How does this impact on the administration, management and 
quality of the R&M service?  
 
To what extent is the imposition of the economic model of market competition on 
local authorities eroding their capacity and capabilities to provide basic services? 
How is this affecting local authority strategies in the areas of employment terms and 
conditions, training, and working conditions in respect of housing and building 
services departments’ workforces? What are the broader impacts of the model on the 
already fragmented structure of the construction industry (72% of all firms in the 
construction industry comprise 1-3 employees, (DTI, 2004))? To what extent is public 
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private partnership attempting to bridge the gaps in the supply of services by private 
providers and integrate the fragmented inputs? What does this imply in terms of 
management input? How far is the PPP model succeeding to deliver a seamless and 
satisfactory service to tenants?  
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